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THE LEGAL NATURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS*

Archibald Coxt

I
NE reflecting upon the legal nature of a collective bargaining
agreement can hardly avoid beginning with the thought that
the institution has flourished outside of the courts and administrative agencies and often in the face of legal interference. The
law had fallen into disrepute in the world of labor relations
because it failed to meet the needs of men. Collective bargaining
agreements were negotiated and administered without regard to
conventional legal sanctions. Grievance procedures and arbitration
evolved into an intricate and highly organized, private judicature.
Many experienced and perceptive observers argued that the conventional sanctions for commercial contracts should not apply
to labor agreements.1
The national labor policy is now set upon another course.
Section 30 I of the Labor Management Relations Act2 supplied
legal sanctions for collective bargaining agreements, and no one
supposes that time will reverse the decision. There are increasing
numbers of direct suits to enforce rights under labor contracts.
Arbitration cases may also bring the courts farther into the administration of collective bargaining agreements. Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama3 affords an opportunity to
compel a recalcitrant party to proceed to arbitration, but in doing
so it also necessarily grants the party who is reluctant to arbitrate
a forum in which to raise questions of arbitrability; heretofore
he supposed that he was forced to take his chances with the arbitrator or risk the accusation of bad faith. In the unhappy event that
the federal courts embrace the Cutler-Hammer doctrine, they will

0

•An address delivered at an institute on Collective Bargaining and the Law, The
University of Michigan Law School, August I, 1958-Ed.
tRoyall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.-Ed.
l Much the best exposition of this philosophy is Shulman, "Reason, Contract, and
Law in Labor Relations," 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 at 1001-1002, 1024 (1955).
2 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §185.
3 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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frequently be called upon to decide whether the claim sought to
be arbitrated raises a disputable issue or one so frivolous that
arbitration should not be ordered-a formula which inevitably
takes the court into the merits of the dispute. 4
In my opinion both the institutions of self-government proliferated by collective bargaining and the surrounding legal system
can gain strength from mutual support but, whether one approves
or disapproves the trend, it must be recognized that section 30 I
and the Lincoln Mills case draw the courts a considerable distance
into both the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
and the formulation of legal principles to govern their judicial
enforcement. By instructing the federal courts to create a body
of substantive law applicable to suits under section 301, the same
case has given the profession an extraordinary creative opportunity. There are no settled rules governing rights and remedies
under collective bargaining agreements. 5 Whether judges apply
existing contract doctrines blindly or accommodate the law to the
needs of the industrial world will depend upon the imagination
and attitude of labor Ia·wyers.
4 In International Assn. of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917 at
918, 67 N.Y.S. (2d) 317 (1947), affd. 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. (2d) 464 (1947), the court held:
"While the contract provides for arbitration of disputes as to the 'meaning, performance,
non-performance or application' of its provisions, the mere assertion by a party of a
meaning of a provision which is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the words cannot
make an arbitrable issue. It is for the Court to determine whether the contract contains
a provision for arbitration of the dispute tendered, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction
the Court must determine whether there is such a dispute. If the meaning of the provision
of the contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to
arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration." The doctrine is highly
controversial. Compare Marceau, "Are All Interpretations 'Admissible'?" 12 ARB. J. 150
(1957), with Summers, "Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration," 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1
(1952) and Cox, "Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration," 30 ROCKY MT.
L. REv. 247 at 258-266 (1958). It is an open question whether the doctrine will be adopted
by the federal courts. See, e.g., Local 149, American Federation of Technical Engineers
v. General Electric Co., (1st Cir. 1957) 250 F. (2d) 922; In re Jacobson, (D.C. Mass. 1958)
42 L.R.R.M. 2070; -New Bedford Defense Products Div. of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Intl. Union, UAW, (D.C. Mass. 1958) 160 F. Supp. 103.
5 There are scattered state decisions which the federal judges may use as precedents
in the same way that one state supreme court looks to the decisions in another jurisdiction. Thus the Lincoln Mills opinion declares that "state law, if compatible with the
purpose of §301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate
the federal policy. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal
law and will not be an independent source of private rights." 353 U.S. 448 at 457. The
general principles of contract law may also furnish decisional criteria. In each instance,
however, the federal courts will have a power of choice until a federal law of collective
bargaining agreements has been developed. It seems virtually certain that the federal
substantive law will oust state law fyom the whole field of cases affecting interstate
commerce. Mccarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. (2d)
45, 315 P. (2d) 322 (1957).
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The starting point is sure to be the familiar rules of contract
law. Williston tells us that a "contract is a promise, or a set of
promises, for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." 6
Pound and Corbin give essentially the same definition. 7 Since 1947
a collective bargaining agreement has been a set of promises which
the law will enforce. Indeed it is a contract within any acceptable
definition.
Looking a little deeper it seems fair to say that voluntarism
and bargain are the two fundamental qualities of contract. The
very notion of contract implies acceptance of an obligation which
the law does not impose. A promise is a consensual undertaking.
Ordinarily a contract also involves exchange.
Voluntarism and bargain are also significant ingredients of a
collective bargaining agreement. The law leaves the employer and
the collectivity of employees free to agree or refrain from agreement subject only to the obligation that they bargain in good
faith. The terms of the bargain are not determined by the government; in this respect both management and labor enjoy much
greater freedom than a utility or insurance company dealing with
the public.
In fact neither the employer nor the employees collectively
have the freedom to disagree which characterizes typical contracts
between business firms and individuals. Sooner or later the employer and employees must strike some kind of a bargain. For
both the costs of delay can be very heavy. The compulsion has
two relevant consequences. First, it partially explains the gaps
and deliberate ambiguities in collective bargaining agreements
which create distinctive problems of interpretation. The pressure
to reach an agreement is so great that the parties are willing to
contract although each knows that the other places a different
meaning on the words and they share only the common intent to
postpone the issue and take a gamble upon an arbitrator's ruling
if decision is required. 8 Second, the importance of having some

WILLISI'ON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1 (1936).
"Contracts," 4 ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 323 (1931).
s The same phenomenon appears in legislation, probably more often than outsiders
realize. The best example to come to my attention is NLRA §S(c), 61 Stat. 142 (1947),
29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(c). The House bill [H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947)] immunized
an employer's anti-union speech "if it does not by its own terms threaten force or economic
reprisal." As passed by the Senate [S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947)], the bill granted
6

7
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agreement means that the arbitrator can hardly say that there was
no meeting of the minds upon the question before him, that therefore there was no contract, and that the parties should go back and
negotiate a solution. 9
These consequences of the practical compulsion to sign and
preserve collective agreements mean that interpretation must
assume a more creative role than in most commercial or property
litigation. I shall return to this point later but I take it that
neither the practical qualifications nor their consequences can
obscure the importance of the elements of voluntarism and bargain
in both ordinary contracts and collective bargaining agreements.
If these reasons for thinking that contract will be the starting
point in evolving a law of collective agreements seem too theoreticaf let me suggest a very practical reason: One must start
somewhere and there is no better place to begin. If you doubt the
force of this consideration, reflect upon the number of opinions by
experienced labor arbitrators invoking ordinary contract principles as grounds of decision.
Among the arbitration fraternity and in academic circles it
has been fashionable to stress the uniqueness of collective bargaining agreements. Clyde Summers tells us:
"The collective agreement differs as much from the common
contract as Humpty Dumpty differs from a common egg.
The failure of the courts to see and remember the differences causes confusion and leads them to blunder. They
misconceive the relationship, hobble arbitration, and misinterpret the agreement, and defeat the intent of the partiesall because they forget they are in a world quite unlike their
own."10

immunity "if such statement contains under all the circumstances no threat, express or
implied, of reprisal or force. . . ." Conference committee deleted the italicized phrases
from both bills.
9 The point is illustrated by a typical arbitration case. The issue was whether a
company, at a time of very heavy cut-backs, could put foremen back to work in the
bargaining unit according to seniority based upon total years of service with the company
or, if not, then according to seniority accumulated between the date of first employment
and the date of promotion. The contract was absolutely ·blind. It seems certain that the
parties had never thought about the pending situation. I am certain, however, that j:)oth
sides would have been outraged if I had said that this was an omitted case on which
they should go back and negotiate because there had been no meeting of the minds.
Indeed the company and union were negotiating a new agreement at the time they submitted the case for decision. In effect they wished me to write the relevant terms of the
new agreement while construing the old.
10 Summers, "Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration," 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 at 17-18

(1952).
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Often the difference is important, but the time has passed when
we could simply erect a "no trespassing" sign and separate industrial relations from the law. The law has moved into the sphere
of grievance adjustment and contract administration. Labor
relations has spilled over into judicial territory. Labor, management, and arbitrators must recognize that the law often expresses
ideals and needs of society which limit their freedom of action. The
law of contracts often embodies these ideals. It may also embody
lessons of experience entirely applicable to collective bargaining
agreements. Conversely the law can satisfy the needs of the industrial world only if there is a strong infusion of many of the ideas
and conventions, heretofore unknown to law but appropriate to
group action, which have gained acceptance in the world of labor
relations. It is not enough to halt after taking the important first
step of emphasizing the unique aspects of collective bargaining
agreements.
First, we must press on to show how these peculiar qualities
affect the application of the normal principles of contract interpretation and enforcement.
Second, we should seek a synthesis of our notions concerning
collective bargaining agreements-an explanation of their inner
logic-a coherent description not merely of the institution but of
its legal consequences. Judges cannot be expected to perceive the
legal nature of a collective bargaining agreement if those whose·
lives straddle labor relations and the law cannot articulate their
perceptions.
It would be satisfying to offer a tentative thesis. This paper is
only an effort to illustrate the interplay between some of the
special institutional characteristics of collective agreements and
the applicability of normal contract and agency rules.

II
A unique characteristic of a collective bargaining agreement is
the number of people affected. The habit of speaking of a triangular relationship involving employer, labor union, and individual employees obscures the number of employees and the·
complexity of their interests. Under some contracts the number
of individual employees reaches tens of thousands; it is usually
more than fifty. The identity of the employees may change from
day to day; Joe Smith quits but Annie Jones is hired. Often
several employees have conflicting interests, as where the. claim

6
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is that some are being permitted to deprive others of work by doing
jobs outside of their own classification. The second party-the
labor union or collective bargaining representative-is in a very
teal sense only the third party-the individual employees-acting
as an organized group through its agents and constitutional proc- ·
~sses. Thus, if we think of the union as an agent and the
employees as principals, we have the paradox that the agent is only
the principals acting as an organization. The group interests,
however, may conflict with the claims of individuals because
~everal classes of individuals have divergent interests, because the
d~mands of group organization and coherence clash with individual self-interest, or even because the union officialdom is not
fmmediately responsive to the wishes of a numerical majority of
the me.mbers. Since experience offers no factual parallel to these
~rrangements, no other legal conception is quite analogous.
· A group cannot function effectively without rules for its government. When the group is a wholly voluntary association it may
adopt its own rules, but under collective bargaining the group
is only partly voluntary and the Railway Labor and National
L~bpr Relations Acts provide rules for its government. NLRA
section 9 (a) provides that the representatives designated by a
majority of the employees in a bargaining unit shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in the unit. 11 The
~ ational Labor Relations Board defines the bargaining unit and
9-etermines when and how the representative shall be chosen.
These outside rules seriously disturb any effort to analyze
c9llective ba1;"gaining agreements according to the elementary
principles'of contract and agency. Under the principle of majority
rule dissident members of the appropriate unit lose the power to
act for themselves, unlike any ordinary principal to an agency
relation. 12 The ·practicalities of group organization deprive even
a majority of the power to discharge their representative at will;
although the ordinary agency is always revocable, a bargaining
tepresentative can be ousted only upon certain occasions.13 The
agreements executed by the employer with the bargaining representative not only fix a man's wages but they may compel him to
contribute a portion of his earnings to a trust fund, 14 compel his

1149 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159(a).
Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
13 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
14 Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Local 7-116, International Woodworkers, 203 Ore. 342,
12 Medo
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retirement15 or change his seniority without his consent.16 In my
opinion the union may even compromise accrued claims under
an existing contract, but the point may be doubtful.17
Efforts have been made to assimilate all these cases to familiar
contract law by saying that when an employee works in a bargain~
ing unit covered by a collective agreement he enters into a voluntary contract of hire which incorporates its provisions.18 The words
can be made to fit, but the formula has the taste of fiction. The
individual employee may not even know whether the workers are
represented by a labor union. Probably he does not know many of
the major terms of the collective bargaining agreement. It may be
said that this is also true of the farmer who insures his barn or the
professor who ships his books by railway express, but I submit that
Justice Stone provided us with a truer insight when he said,
"Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with
powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents." 19
The rules provided by the government to meet the necessities
of group organization also render many familiar contract rules
inadequate for the analysis of the employer's contractual rights
and duties. The point is most clearly illustrated by the problems
which result whenever it is proposed to change the bargaining
representative during the term of a collective bargaining agree~
ment.
The opportunity to repudiate an unsatisfactory representative
and either revert to individual bargaining or substitute another
agent is a necessary corollary of the principle of freedom of choice.
Orderly government dictates that the choice be made at intervals.
279 P. (2d) 508 (1955), rehearing den. 203 Ore. 342, 280 P. (2d) 412 (1955). It may be
worth noting, however, that the same collective bargaining agreement increased wages
in an amount equal to the employees' contributions.
15 Lamon v. Georgia Southern & Fla. R. Co., 212 Ga. 63, 90 S.E. (2d) 658 (1955).
McMullans v. Kansas, 0. & G. Ry. Co., (10th Cir. 1956) 229 F. (2d) 50.
16 Walker v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 142 N.J. Eq. 588, 61 A. {2d) 453
(1948); Leeder v. Cities' Service Oil Co., 199 Okla. 618, 189 P. (2d) 189 (1948).
17 Cox, "Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements," 8 LAB. L. J.
850 (1957).
18 Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., (3d Cir.
1954) 210 F. (2d) 623, affd. on other grounds 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
19 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 at 202 (1944). Compare the following
statement in Justice Murphy's concurring opinion, at 208: "Congress, through the Railway
Labor Act, has conferred upon the union selected by a majority of a craft or class of
railway workers the power to represent the entire craft or class in all collective bargaining
matters. While such a union is essentially a private organization, its power to represent
and bind all members of a craft or class is derived solely from Congress."
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An otherwise appropriate occasion for raising the question of
representation may fall within the term of an unexpired collective
bargaining agreement which not only confers rights and liabilities
upon the employees as individuals but also affects them in their
group capacity because it confers rights and duties upon the incumbent union as an organization. One cannot give full effect both
to the existing contract and to the choice of a new representative,
i.e., the reformation of the group. The law might put sanctity of
contract above freedom of choice and reason that the employees
surrendered· their right to change representatives when, through
their designated representative, they executed the long term agreement;20 Or it might be said that although the employees may
~ange their representative, they remain bound by the unexpired
agreement in all other respects.21
Apparently this is the teaching of the law of contracts. If A, the
owner _c:if a house, designates B as his renting agent and B negotiates a five-year lease to C at $200 a month, A may not discharge
B two years later, substitute D as his agent, and then avoid the
lease and evict C unless the rent is raised to $250. The lease remains binding between A and C despite the change of agents.
The law of collective bargaining has not yet crystalized but
the trend of development is against the analogy. The National
Labor ·Relations Board took the first step when it held that a
collective bargaining agreement was not a bar to a representation
election after a reasonable period.22 The issue was conceived to
t!:1rn · on striking a balance between the interest in stability and
~~ values of freedom of choice. At first the bar was for a year.
Then it was lengthened to two years; 23 and now the Board is
apparently considering a still longer period.24 In establishing the
rule the Board often protested that its action did not "ipso facto
20 Triboro Coach Corp. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 286 N.Y. 314,
36 N.E. (2d) 315 (1941), points in this direction. See also New England Transportation
Co., I N.L:R.B. 130 (1936).
21 In Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N.L.R.B. 111 at 145-146 (1940), Member Smith
suggested ·that a supervening certification "result[s] merely in the termination by operation of law of the outstanding collective contract or its terms where they conflict with
action by the certified representative . . . , and not in a termination of all substantive
terms of the contract otherwise valid." In his view the recognition clause and union
shop provisions fell in the former category, but the "provisions covering wages, hours of
service, and other working conditions of ·these employees continued in force and were
binding upon the bus drivers as principals after certification."
22 The Trailer Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1943).
23 Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 927 (1947).
24 See 41 LAB. REL. REP. 459 at 462 (1958).
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set aside the contract, or necessarily affect whatever legal rights
may have survived the destruction of the union which negotiated
and signed it.'' 2;;
One can hardly appraise the unstabilizing effect of a new election without considering its potential impact upon an existing
collective bargaining agreement. If the new representative simply
administers the old agreement until it expires by its terms, the
change in representatives can hardly upset existing arrangements.
The uncertainties are greater if the employer has a legal duty to
negotiate changes in the existing agreement. If the contract is
swept away by the change in representatives, it loses force as a
stabilizing influence and an upheaval may result. But whether the
NLRB analysis was disingenuous or simply incomplete, the rule is
well established. It was a recognized part of our labor relations law
when Congress made a thorough overhaul of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1947 without reversing the doctrine. 26 We are left
to reason out the consequences.
The first question is whether the employer has a duty to bargain collectively with the new representative about subjects covered by the contract with the old bargaining agent. In American
Seating Company 21 the Board unanimously held that a refusal to
bargain under these circumstances would violate section 8(a)(5):
" ... if a newly chosen representative is to be hobbled in the
way proposed by the Respondent [i.e., by binding it to the
old contract], a great part of the benefit to be derived from
the no-bar rule will be dissipated. There is little point in
selecting a new bargaining representative which is unable
to negotiate new terms and conditions of employment for an
extended period." 28
Member Rogers has indicated a disposition to change the rule,
and the conservative Republicans occasionally propose its overturn
by legislation. 29 Thus far, however, the American Seating doctrine
25 E.g., Container
26 Indeed it may

Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 823 at 827 (1945).
be argued that §8(d) implicitly approved the doctrine in its concluding clauses. See note 30 infra.
27 106 N .L.R.B. 250 (1953).
28 Id. at 255.
29 During the consideration of the Kennedy-Ives bill in the Senate there were proposals to overturn the contract bar rule so that elections might be held at any time in
interests of "union democracy," but to preserve the old contract until it expired by its
terms in the interest of "stability." The amendments were defeated-I think wisely. The
NLRB is apparently considering imposing this rule upon unions in cases in which a
schism removes the normal contract bar to an election. See 41 LAB. REL. REI•. 459 (1958).
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stands as the latest NLRB ruling and while it has not been subjected to judicial review, one may safely hazard the guess that the
courts will approve it for reasons stated below.30
The critical question in comparing ordinary contract law to
the evolving law of collective bargaining agreements is whether
any obligations under the existing agreement survive the supervening certification. The American Seating doctrine does not
logically compel an affirmative answer because the employer might
have a duty to bargain in good faith about proposed changes in
terms and conditions of employment even though the contract
remained in force and would continue to govern plant relationships except as changes were mutually agreed. On this question
the books afford no precedent.
To make the issue concrete, suppose that an employer and the
United Automobile Workers execute a four-year contract which
fixes $2.00 an hour as the wage rate for assembly-line workers
and $2.75 an hour for maintenance electricians. The contract
provides pension and insurance benefits financed by matching
payments of 7½ cents an hour with the employees' share deducted
from their wages. A "no strike" clause provides, "The union promises that it will not call or sanction, and on behalf of the
employees promises that they will not engage in, any strike, slowdown or other interruption of work during the term of this
agreement."
30 See pp. 11-14 infra. There is also room for arguing that NLRA §8(d)(4), 61 Stat. 143
(1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(d)(4), implies congressional approval of this conclusion.
Section 8(d) provides that a bargaining representative which is party to an existing collective agreement shall be deemed guilty of an unfair labor practice unless it gives notice
of the desire to terminate or modify an existing contract, offers to meet and confer for
the purpose of negotiating a new contract, and then "continues in full force and effect,
without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of
such contract, whichever occurs later." The next sentence provides that the foregoing
duties "shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under
which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been
superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees...." It is fair inference
that the new representative is free to bargain and, so far as the NLRA is concerned, free
to strike uninhibited by the old contract. The sentep.ce also goes on to declare that "the
duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to
any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period,
if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract."
Although it does not compel the conclusion, the juxtaposition of these passages suggests that the draftsman assumed that a party would be required to discuss modification
of the terms and conditions of employment in an existing contract upon the certification
of a new representative.
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After two years the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers is certified as the bargaining representative of the maintenance electricians. Three ensuing questions deserve consideration.
(I) What remedies has the employer if the IBEW calls the
electricians out on strike in support of a demand that their wages
be raised from the $2.75 fixed in the UAW contract to $3.00 an
hour? IBEW made no promises to the employer and while the law
might conceivably compel the new representative to assume all the
obligations of the old agreement, this hypothesis is inconsistent
with the rule that it may bargain for new terms of employment.
The obligations of the employees are less certain, for the UAW
may well have had the power to bind the electricians as principals
to obligations not released by the change of agents. If the conventional rules apply, the electricians could therefore be enjoined
from striking in breach of contract and the IBEW from inducing
the breach.
(2) After the certification would the employer be legally free
to· reduce the electricians' wages to $2.60 an hour-fifteen cents
below the rate fixed in the UAW contract-as soon as it satisfied
the duty to bargain with IBEW before taking unilateral action?
If an electrician thought that he was underpaid, might he sue for
breach of contract? These questions are not quite the same as the
first inquiry because the intervening certification might be held
to give the new bargaining representative an election to accept or
disaffirm the old contract in the manner of a debtor in a reorganization proceeding.31
(3) What becomes of the UAW contract in relation to the
segments of the old bargaining unit with respect to which UAW
continues to be the bargaining representative? UAW might argue
that any change in the electricians' wages or conditions of employment upsets intraplant relationships which were so basic to the old
agreement that their disturbance discharges its obligations.
I am inclined to think that the law will ultimately be that the
UAW contract is terminated, so far as the electricians are concerned, immediately upon the NLRB determination that the
electricians have changed their group organization and chosen a
new representative. There are three reasons for this conclusion.
First. Many important parts of the UAW contract cannot
316 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY,

14th ed. (Moore &: Oglebay) §3.23 (1957).
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possibly be applied to the electricians without ignoring the NLRB
certification. The recognition clause is a promise to bargain exclusively with the UAW, which could not be observed after the
certification without violating section 8(a)(5). It would be highly
incongruous, although probably not illegal, to continue to require
electricians to maintain UAW membership as a condition of employment or to check-off UAW dues. In the Modine Mfg. Co. case
the Sixth Circuit held that a labor union retains no rights under
a collective bargaining agreement after it has been superseded as
the employees' representative.32
Possibly the parts of a collective bargaining agreement which
confer rights upon the old representative as an organization can
be severed while preserving the remainder, 33 but I am inclined
to think that once the obligations of the union shop, the check-off
and the recognition clause have been swept away, the other clauses
fall with them. Many substantive provisions are intertwined with
the identification of a particular representative. In our hypothetical case there is a promise to make payments into a UAW
trust fund for providing welfare and pension benefits. Surely the
electricians would p.ot continue to pay into a trust fund administered by UAW, yet if those payments were suspended the whole
question of wages should be reopened, for the suspension would
alter the burdens and benefits of the entire agreement.
Second. There are often clauses in a collective bargaining
agreement which could be lawfully applied after an intervening
certification but which would scarcely fit the new conditions. This
is especially true in a case of craft severance. One can hardly
imagine a small unit of pattern makers handling grievances under
the complex provisions of the General Motors contract. Seniority
clauses which were suitable while all the production and maintenance workers were in a single bargaining unit might become highly
inappropriate after severance. The old union might have been
equipped to participate in a complicated job evaluation and rating
plan while the new union commands neither the skill nor the
interest.
Third. Employees frequently change representatives because
they are dissatisfied with existing substantive conditions of employ-

32

Modine Mfg. Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists, (6th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d)

33

See note 21 supra.

326.
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ment and not merely with the manner in which their previous
representative administered the agreement. As a matter of practical
politics the new union must show that it can render better service
and this requires making some kind of changes regardless of
whether they actually benefit or merely seem to benefit the
employees. Of course it might be argued that once the employees
have become parties to a contract as principals, their dissatisfaction
with substantive terms of employment is irrelevant so long as the
contract endures. The question then becomes whether the law can
force adherence to the old arrangement and still preserve a sound,
efficient production unit governed with some measure of industrial
justice. My only contention is that it is unrealistic to attempt to
separate the question whether a new election shall be held from
the question of the continued effectiveness of the old agreement.
Once it is decided to certify a new representative termination of
the old agreement is a practical necessity.
I know of no satisfactory way in which to explain this result in
terms of normal contract theories. Possibly one could say that
continued representation of the employees by the union which
signs the contract is an implied condition of all its obligations
somewhat as the survival of a particular soloist may be an implied
condition of a contract for a concert.34 The explanation would
not suffice, however, if the terms of the collective agreement negatived the implication; and it seems unlikely that the law will
permit the parties to change the rule by private agreement.
In a number of cases the NLRB argued that a long term
contract did not bar an election because it was "of unreasonable
duration," thereby implying either that the representative had
exceeded its authority or else that the agreement was against
public policy. 35 Member Reilly elaborated the first alternative
at some length in a dissenting opinion in Container Corporation,36
saying in part, "I have always thought . . . that our justification
rested upon the theory that these were not valid contracts and,
hence, not a bar to a present redetermination of the bargaining
representative."
There are two difficulties with attributing the ineffectiveness
of the contract to a defect in the agent's authority. First, it does

6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1334 (1951).
NLRB SEVENTH ANNUAL 1REPORT 55 (1942).
36 61 N.L.R.B. 823 at 829 (1945).
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not explain all the cases. The termination of the contract by a new
certification after a schism37 or the disintegration of the incumbent
union38 cannot be explained by any original defect in authority
of the incumbent unless we are simply to tuck all our conclusions
into the premise. Second, if the representative lacks authority to
negotiate a contract for more than a reasonable period, then the
contract must cease to bind the employer regardless of which union
wins the election or even if there is no election. The third person
can take advantage of defects in the authority of an agent as well
as the principal.
There is no greater comfort in the suggestion that a contract
is discharged upon a supervening certification because all contracts
are subject to changes in domestic law or the exercise of rightful
governmental authority.39 The problem is not whether the existing contract excuses observance of a government mandate or
even whether the government mandate terminates the contract.
The problem is how are we to explain and fit into a coherent body
of law the government mandate which permits employees to choose
new representatives under specified conditions and thus gain release from a contract which would continue to bind them if the
representative had not been changed. The only possible explanation which I can see is that the rules necessary to group organization and collective bargaining require us frankly to disregard
some of the. normal rules of contracts and agency and to devise
special corollaries to the propositions articulated by Congress and
the National Labor Relations Board as its delegate.

III
The ease with which one can show that collective bargaining
agreements have characteristics which preclude the application of
some of the familiar principles of contracts and agency creates the
danger that those who are knowledgeable about collective bargaining will demand that we discard all the precepts of contract
law and create a new law of collective bargaining agreements. I
have already expressed the view that the courts would ignore the
plea but surely it is unwise even if they would sustain it. Many
legal rules have hardened into conceptual doctrines which lawyers
Brenizer Trucking Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 810 (1942).
Container Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 823 (1945).
30 See, e.g., American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 at 254, n. 22 (1953).
37
38
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invoke with little thought for the underlying reasons, but the doctrines themselves represent an accumulation of tested wisdom, they
are bottomed upon notions of fairness and sound public policy,
and it would be a foolish waste to climb the ladder all over again
just because the suggested principles were developed in other contexts and some of them are demonstrably inapposite. Any careful
student of contracts would tell us that there are as wide differences
in the substantive rules and precepts of interpretation applicable
to different kinds of contracts as there are between what labor
relations specialists call "ordinary contracts" and collective bargaining agreements. A long term requirements contract poses
different problems from the sale of Blackacre. A contract to build
a house is not a contract of marriage. Should not our attitude be
one of inquiry into the pertinency of the reasons for each contract
rule? Some contract rules stand up well in the new environment as
I shall endeavor to show in this portion of my paper. They appear
to be those which derive from functional aspects of commercial
contracts that are also important characteristics of collective bargaining agreements. The doctrine of failure of consideration
and the element of "bargain" or "exchange" furnish a prime
illustration.
The idea of "exchange" lies behind a substantial part of the
law of contracts. Section 266 of the Restatement of Contracts states
that, with two immaterial exceptions, "In all bilateral contracts
where the only consideration on each side consists of promises, all
the promises on one side taken collectively and all the promises on
the other side taken collectively are promises for an agreed
exchange: . . ."
The importance of the rule is that it makes the duties of the
contracting parties mutually dependent. Section 274 states, "In
promises for an agreed exchange, any material failure of performance by one party not justified by the conduct of the other discharges the latter's duty to give the agreed exchange even though
his promise is not in terms conditional. An immaterial failure does
not operate as such a discharge."
Since a collective bargaining agreement has a strong element
of exchange, there would seem to be no a priori reason not to
follow these doctrines whenever there is a breach. Surely the notion
that it is unjust to require a person to perform his promise when
he will not receive the agreed exchange is as applicable to management and labor as it is to commercial enterprises. There will be
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differences, to be sure, in the way the rule works out, as I shall show
in a moment, but the differences can be worked out in determining
when the failure of consideration is "material."
The application of ordinary contract principles would have
avoided the creation of ill-starred precedent in the Mastro Plastics
case.40 During the term of a collective bargaining agreement with
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Mastro Plastics Corporation engaged in a vigorous campaign of unfair labor practices
designed to oust the Carpenters as bargaining representative in
favor of another union. The campaign reached a climax with the
discharge of Ciccone, a vigorous adherent of the Carpenters. The
employees struck in protest. Mastro discharged the strikers, who
later sought reinstatement by the NLRB on the ground that the
strike was caused by unfair labor practices. One defense was that
the strike violated a clause in an unexpired collective bargaining
agreement by which the union agreed "to refrain from engaging in
any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement."
The NLRB overruled this defense on the ground that the "no
strike" clause was to be interpreted as coextensive with the arbitration clause, which covered "differences ... as to the meaning and
application of this agreement.... " 41 The court of appeals sustained
the Board, saying:
"The right of employees to strike in resistance to unfair
labor practices by an employer is a fundamental one which the
statute recognizes and no contractual waiver of that right is to
be inferred from general provisions in a collective bargaining
contract which do not make it clear that strikes caused by the
employer's unfair labor practices were included in the
prohibition. " 42
The Supreme Court held that "the contract did not waive the
employees' right to strike solely against the unfair labor practices
of their employers."43 Even the dissenting justices agreed with this
conclusion.
Such unanimity should forestall criticism, but I submit that
the judicial interpretation of the undertaking "to refrain from

40 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956), affirming (2d Cir. 1954) 214
F. (2d) 462, which enforced 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953).
41103 N.L.R.B. 511 at 514-515 (1953).
42 (2d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 462 at 464-465.
43 350 U.S. 270 at 284 (1956).
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engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of this
agreement" both violates the plain and inherently sensible
meaning of the words and also threatens normal collective bargaining practices. In discharge cases the claim is often made that
the supervisor was motivated by distaste for the employee's activities in pressing grievances or otherwise assisting the union. Management is not infrequently charged with taking unilateral action
in violation of a contract and presumably the unilateral action is
also an unfair labor practice. I had always supposed, and I think
that both companies and unions have usually supposed, that to call
a strike by reason of isolated discriminatory discharges or unwarranted bits of unilateral action would violate a typical "no strike"
provision. I still think that this attitude is the only one consistent
with sound labor-management relations. The Supreme Court's
approach, however, rejects this view for it leaves no room for
distinctions based upon the seriousness of the employer's unfair
labor practice. Surely a promise not to call "any strike or work
stoppage" cannot be interpreted to cover strikes against little
unfair labor practices but not against big ones.
The application of familiar contract principles would have
led to the same result without distorting the words or creating the
embarrassing precedent. By executing the collective bargaining
agreement Mastro impliedly promised not to engage in conduct
attacking the existence or representative status of the Carpenters
Union. The words of a contract do not express all its obligations.
It is an ancient principle that, "where a party stipulates that another shall do a certain thing, he thereby impliedly promises that
he will himself do nothing which will hinder or obstruct the other
in doing that thing." 44 Surely a gross attack upon the existence of
a labor union increases the difficulty of performing its contract
obligations. Williston tells us that there is also in every contract
"an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which
will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the fruits of the contract; in other words, in every
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing." 45 A successful attack upon the status of the collective
bargaining representative obviously deprives it of the fruits which

44 Gay v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 at 504 (1880). See also
§315(l) (1932).
45 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §670 (1936).

CONTRACTS REsrATEMENT

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 57

it expects to receive from the collective bargaining agreement.
Under the doctrine that a material failure of consideration discharges the promise, the Carpenters Union was excused fr~m
performance of the "no strike" clause if Mastro's breach of its
implied obligations was material. The unfair labor practices were
numerous. They were part of a deliberate campaign to introduce
another union as bargaining representative. Therefore the breach
was undeniably material.
Analysis in terms of familiar contract principles thus not only
sustains the result in the Mastro Plastics case but it also provides
a more useful technique for future cases. A single discriminatory
discharge or bit of unilateral action would not be a material breach
and would not excuse counter-performance. More serious unfair
labor practices would be material. Rules have been stated for determining materiality but in the end the test is whether it will "be
more conformable to justice in the particular case to free the
injured party [i.e., the union], or, on the other hand, to require
him to perform his promise, in both cases giving him a right of
action if the [company's] failure to perform was wTongful." 46
Although the element of "exchange" makes the doctrines of
dependent convenants and failure of consideration applicable to a
collective agreement, some of its other qualities should affect the
manner of their application. A collective bargaining contract is
made to be broken. The number of people involved, both as
employees and as supervisors, makes large and small violations
inevitable. This is one reason for the grievance procedure and
arbitration. Collective agreements are negotiated for substantial
periods after much travail. There are enormous pressures to reach
agreement. There will be no rules to govern the enterprise if the
contract is set aside. These are proper factors to evaluate in determining whether a breach is material. They argue for continuing
the contract and leaving the injured party to his legal or contractual remedies. Consequently, I am skeptical of the trend toward
holding that a strike in breach of contract automatically gives the
employer the right to terminate the agreement. 47 There would
seem to be room for judgment based upon the length of the strike,

§275, comment a (1932).
E.g., Marathon Electric Mfg. Co., 106 NL.R.B. 1171 (1953), affd. (D.C. Cir. 1955)
223 F. (2d) 338; Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Lodge No. 751, I.A.M., (9th Cir.
1951) 188 F. (2d) 356, affirming (W.D. Wash. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 596.
46 CONTRACTS REsrATEMENT

47
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the number of employees affected, the injury to the employer, the
degree of fault upon the part of the union, and the likelihood that
the contract will be honored for the remainder of its term. Perhaps
the line will ultimately be drawn between a more or less spontaneous uprising and a planned resort to economic pressure
sanctioned by union officials in the deliberate disregard of their
written obligation. In any event the judicial fault, if there is any,
is one of judgment and not in choosing the conventional contract
method of analysis.

IV
There are rules applicable to "common" or "commercial"
contracts which can be helpful in resolving cases arising under
collective bargaining agreements because they furnish the conceptual tools of analysis even though the ultimate answer turns
less on the concepts than on evaluation of the functional aspects
of the agreement. This point is illustrated by the question whether
the union or the individual employee is the proper party to
sue to enforce, or to settle, a claim under a collective bargaining
agreement.
One early conceptual view was that although a collective
bargaining agreement gave no rights to individual workers, whenever a man went to work his individual contract incorporated the
union agreement as a local custom or usage so that every failure
to pay wages in accordance with the collective agreement was a
breach of the individual contract of employment.48 Of course the
parties to an ordinary commercial contract may stipulate that their
agreement does not include local usages but this difficulty was
surmounted by saying that under the Railway Labor and National
Labor Relations Acts the collective agreement is included in each
individual's contract of employment by force of law somewhat
as a carrier's tariff or the statutory provisions of an insurance
policy.40 Under this view, which was adopted by the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit50 and followed by Justice Reed in
the Westinghouse case,51 the legal relation between the employer,

E.g., Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. &: T. P. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913).
I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 at 334-335 (1944).
50 Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., (3d
Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 623.
51Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348
U.S. 437 at 464 (1955).
48

40

J.
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the union and the employees is conceived as two bilateral contracts. One contract-between the employer and the union-is
made up partly of promises running to the benefit of the union
as an organization, like the check-off or closed shop clauses, which
the union alone can enforce, 52 and partly of provisions relating to
wages, hours and job security which the employer promises to incorporate in a second bilateral contract-the contract of hire between the employer and the individual employees. Under this
theory the union may sue for breach of the first contract but since
it is not a party to the second contract, only the individual may sue
for the breach of promises running to his benefit. And since the
claim for compensation is the individual's it must follow that the
union has no power to make a binding settlement.
A second theory holds that a collective bargaining agreement
is a third-party contract with the employer as promisor, the union
as promisee, and the employees as third-party beneficiaries. 53 In
the Westinghouse case Circuit Judge Staley argued that this description does not fit the facts because such promises as the union
shop and check-off do not benefit individual workers, 54 but surely
some of the promises in an instrument may run to the benefit of
third parties while others benefit the promisee alone. The other
objection to the third-party beneficiary theory-that the individual's labor is the sole consideration for the obligation to pay wages
-is hardly an accurate description of the facts. In negotiating a collective agreement the employer promises a given wage scale as part
of a package deal in return for various undertakings by the union
including the promise not to strike, and it is rather unlikely that he
would have agreed to the same wage scale without the union's
promises. The individual's furnishing labor is consideration, but
not the only consideration, for the employer's promise to pay. Under this theory either the union or the employee may sue for
breach of the promises inuring to the benefit of individual workers. 55 When the individual sues, judgment may be entered for the
amount due him. When the union sues, the decree may be for spe52 MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., (9th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 170, cert. den. 340 U.S. 828
(1950); Volquardsen v. Southern Amusement Co., (La. App. 1934) 156 S. 678.
53 E.g., Leahy v. Smith, 137 Cal. App. (2d) 884, 290 P. (2d) 679 (1955).
54Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., (3d
Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 623 at 628.
55 Heins v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350, 219 N.W. 287 (1928) (creditor beneficiary); Croker
v. New York Trust Co., 245 N.Y. 17, 156 N.E. 81 (1927) (donee beneficiary); CONTRACTS
REsTATEl\lENT §§135, 345 (1932).
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cific performance or the company can be required to pay the
money into the registry of court for distribution to individual
workers in supplementary proceedings. 56 In a suit by either an individual or the union alone, the judgment would not bind the absent party but the employer could protect himself against a second
suit by impleading the absent party.
Third, the legal situation under a collective bargaining agreement may be somewhat loosely compared to a trust with a chose
in action as the res. In this view the bargaining representative,
which is subject to fiduciary obligations,57 holds the employer's
promises in trust for the benefit of the individuals. The trust is a
common legal device for handling situations in which a single
obligee is empowered to play a continuing role in the administration of contracts intended for the benefit of a large and ever changing group of beneficiaries who may have divergent interests. Massachusetts business trusts and mortgage indentures furnish familiar
illustrations. According to this analogy the union would ordinarily
be the only proper party to bring an action for breach of the collective agreement and the judgment would bind the individuals.58
The union can enter into binding settlements with the employer.59
The individual's remedy is to show that the union's handling of
the claim did not meet its fiduciary obligations. 60 In the latter case
the individual could sue the union to compel it-to perform its duties or he could join the union and the company as co-defendants
and seek a judgment for the money alleged to be due him. 61
Such theories are highly useful in determining rights and remedies under collective bargaining agreements. They furnish tools of
analysis. They help us to perceive the implications of particular issues-to see the relation between problems-so that we may achieve
consistency and integrity instead of an illogical mass of ad hoc
decisions. They remind us of the flexibility and adaptability of the
common law. They become dangerous only when artificially selected concepts are allowed to dictate the decision. Any of the three
theories is a sound abstraction. In the final analysis one must deal
56 See cases cited note 55 supra.
57 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1088 at
58 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §§280-282

p. 407 (1951).
(1935); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS §§280-282 (1939).
59 JUDGMENTS RE5TATEMENT §85 (1942).
60 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §§192, 322 (1935); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS §192 (1939); 3 Scorr,
TRUSTS §322 (1939).
61 Cases dealing with the remedy for breach of the duty of fair representation are
collected in Cox, "The Duty of Fair Representation," 2 VILLANOVA L. ,REv. 151 at 175-177
(1957).
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with the underlying questions of policy which make one theory
more appropriate than another. Logic cannot replace wisdom.
Thus we are led back to consideration of the functional nature
of a collective bargaining agreement. What are its purposes? What
does it do? What legal conclusioJJ.s about the right to enforce and
settle claims against the employer result in better performance of
the functions of the agreement?
In the community of the shop the collective bargaining agreement serves a function fairly comparable to the role of the Federal
Trade Commission Act or National Labor Relations Act in the
whole community. It is an instrument of government as well as an
instrument of exchange. The point is highly important both in
evolving substantive law and, as I shall seek to show later, in matters of interpretation.
The governmental nature of a collective bargaining agreement
results partly from the number of people affected and the diversity
of their interests. Harry Shulman aptly suggested other determining conditions:
"[The collective bargaining agreement] is not the typical offer
and acceptance which normally is the basis for classroom or
text discussions of contract law. It is not an undertaking to
produce a specific result; indeed, it rarely speaks of the ultimate product. It is not made by parties who seek each other
out to make a bargain from scratch and then go his own way.
The parties to a collective agreement ... meet in their contract negotiations to fix the terms and conditions of their collaboration for the future." 62
Perhaps "collaboration" is too optimistic a word. Perhaps there is
a "typical" contract only in the sense that economists have a model.
The point which Shulman caught and I am seeking to emphasize
is that the collective agreement governs complex, many-sided relations between large numbers of people in a going concern for
very substantial periods of time. "The trade agreement thus becomes, as it were, the industrial constitution of the enterprise setting forth the broad general principles upon which the relationship of employer and employee is to be conducted." 63
There are important differences of opinion as to the scope of
62 The quotation is from a mimeographed address entitled "The Role of Arbitration
in the Collective Bargaining Process" which is used in courses in the Harvard Trade
Union Program. I believe that it must have been delivered at a meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, but apparently it has not been published.
63 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., (4th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 632 at 638.
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collective bargaining agreements. Sometimes they are viewed as
tightly drawn concessions covering only specifically designated
portions of the broad range of interests which both management
and workers have in the conduct of the enterprise, leaving the managers to govern the rest. Others insist that collective agreements establish a framework for all matters of common interest. I shall
comment on this issue later. Here I wish to emphasize only the
breadth and variety of the subject matter covered under even the
narrowest conception of a labor agreement. Furthermore, since it
also operates prospectively over a long period, a labor agreement
must provide for countless unforeseeable contingencies.
One consequence is that many provisions of the labor agreement must be expressed in general and flexible terms. The concept of "just cause" is an obvious illustration. Sometimes it is not
possible to do more than establish an appropriate set of procedures
for resolving certain issues; witness the provisions for fixing work
loads and piece rates in many of the textile contracts. A collective
agreement rarely expresses all the rights and duties falling within
its scope. One simply cannot spell out every detail of life in an
industrial establishment, or even of that portion which both
management and labor agree is a matter of mutual concern.
It is largely for these reasons that collective bargaining agreements provide their own administrative or judicial machinery. Of
course arbitration long antedates collective bargaining and there
are thousands of commercial contracts and construction contracts
under which arbitration is a daily occurrence. Sometimes, as in a
large scale government construction contract, the functions of the
"arbitrator" may resemble his functions under a labor agreement.
By and large, however, there is this distinct difference: the commercial arbitrator finds facts-did the cloth meet the samplewhile the labor arbitrator necessarily pours meaning into the general phrases and interstices of a document written somewhat in
the generalities· of basic regulatory legislation. Furthermore, because management and employees are involved in continuing relationships, it is at least possible for the arbitrator's rulings to become a body of subordinate rules for the future conduct of the
enterprise. I say "subordinate rules" because the contract may
change them. They are rather like the judge-made law-the rubrics
which the judges put upon statutes, the precepts which govern
where the statute is silent, the context into which new bits of statutory law will be intruded.
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Of course this body of shop law is not made up exclusively or
even largely of arbitration decisions. "The parties to a collective
agreement start in a going enterprise with a store of amorphous
methods, attitudes, fears and problems." 64 The agreement "is based
upon a mass of unstated assumptions and practices as to which the
understanding of the parties may actually differ." 65 The assumptions and practices which have prevailed in the past and as they develop in the future are not only the background of the agreement
but the flesh and blood which gives it meaning.
Individual workers would receive the most protection against
arbitrary treatment under the theory that the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement relating to wages and hours become
effective by incorporation into bilateral contracts of hire between
the employer and each employee. On the other hand it seems to
me that giving the union control over all claims arising under the
collective agreement comports so much better wi~ the functional
nature of a collective bargaining agreement as to make the third
legal theory the most satisfactory. Allowing an individual to carry
a claim to arbitration whenever he is dissatisfied with the adjustment worked out by the company and the union treats issues which
arise in the administration of a contract as if there were always a
"right" interpretation to be divined from the instrument. It discourages the kind of day-to-day cooperation between company and
union which is normally the mark of sound industrial relationsa relationship in which grievances are treated as problems to be
solved and contract clauses are only guideposts in a dynamic human relationship. When the interests of several groups conflict,
or future needs run contrary to present desires, or when the
individual's claim endangers group interests, the union's function
is to resolve the competition by reaching an accommodation or
striking a balance. The process is political. It involves a melange
of power, numerical strength, mutual aid, reason, prejudice, and
emotion. Limits must be placed on the authority of the group, 66
but within the zone of fairness and rationality this method of selfgovernment probably works better than the edicts of any outside
arbiter.
There are other considerations to be evaluated in resolving
64 Note
65 Ibid.
66 The

62 supra.

limits should be imposed under the duty of fair representation. See Cox,
"The Duty of Fair Representation,'' 2 VILLANOVA L. R.Ev. 151 (1957).
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this issue. 67 The only point upon which I wish to insist is the
relevance of the governmental aspects of the collective bargaining
agreement in deciding who may assert and compromise claims for
its violation. I dwell upon them partly for this reason and partly
because they also lead to problems of contract interpretation with
which I shall close this paper.

V
The governmental nature of a collective bargaining agreement
should have predominant influence in its interpretation. The
generalities, the deliberate ambiguities, the gaps, the unforeseen
contingencies, the need for a rule although the agreement is silent
-all require a creativeness quite unlike the attitude of one construing a deed or a promissory note or a three-hundred page corporate trust indenture. Perhaps the requisite attitude can be suggested by likening the interpretation of a collective agreement to
the construction of a basic statute creating an administrative
agency, although the analogy may assume too readily that the
"look-in-dictionary" school of statutory interpretation has given
way to willingness to read basic statutes "not as theorems of Euclid
but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind
them. "68
The interpretation of a statute is the proliferation of a purpose.
In a sense it is misleading to speak of the legislative intent. No
one supposes that the tens of senators and hundreds of representatives who vote for a bill have one common state of mind. I trust,
also, that arbitrators who speak of "the intent of the parties" do
not mean to imply that they are concerned with the secret, unexpressed intent of either party. Those who listen seriously to the
testimony of negotiators concerning what they understood or
supposed or intended run the risk of imposing upon one side the
unilateral suppositions of the other. The true standard of interpretation must be objective. 69 To speak of intent as if the congressmen or negotiators had reached a conclusion upon the specific
issue is also misleading. The troublesome issues during the administration of a statute or contract are usually those which the
67 Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1956); Cox,
"Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements," 8 LAB. L. J. 850 (1957).
68 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, (2d Cir. 1914) 218 F. 547 at 553, cert. den.
235 U.S. 705 (1915).
69 CONTRACTS R.E5TATEMENT §20 (1932).
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authors either refused to face or failed to anticipate. Yet to speak
of intent, when the word is properly understood, serves two useful functions. It reminds the interpreter that the statute or contract
is a purposive instrument. The metaphor also cautions the interpreter that it is his duty to effectuate the will of the Congressor of the parties to the contract-even though he himself might
reach an infinitely wiser decision. What the interpreter must
strive to do, therefore, is to give the instrument the application
which the author would have provided if he had consciously determined the issue.70
In the case of a statute the best guide to this meaning is its
policy or purpose. Behind the words there usually lies a general
aim, an objective, which embodies specific meanings, half-understood, half-unarticulated; and by these one may judge specific
cases.
"Life overflows its molds and the will outstrips its own universals. Men cannot know their own meaning till the variety of
its manifestations is disclosed in its final impacts and the full
content of no design is grasped till it has got beyond its general formulation and become differentiated in its last incidence. It should be, and it may be, the function of the
profession to manifest such purposes in their completeness
if it can achieve the genuine loyalty which comes not from
obedience, but from the according will, for interpretation is
a mode of the will and understanding is a choice." 71
Many questions of interpretation can be handled in this fashion under collective bargaining agreements. The most ambiguous
phrase may be directed to a practical problem, and it is an obvious
mistake to read the words without attention to the problem.
Because the problems are usually unfamiliar and are often subtle,
70 As good an illustration as any is NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111
(1944). The issue was whether newsboys could properly be found to ,be "employees"
within the National Labor Relations Act despite the employer's want of control over
the manner in which the work was done. According to the conventional common law
view there is no employment relation unless the putative employer enjoys a right of
control. The NLRB argued for a broader standard which would determine the applicabil•
ity of the statute in doubtful situations by the underlying economic facts showing whether
the particular workers were subject to evils the statute was intended to eradicate and
whether the remedies were appropriate rather than by technical, previously established
legal classifications. The Supreme Court observed that the Wagner Act sometimes adopted
and sometimes rejected established legal classifications. In choosing between the alternatives the Court inquired which interpretation I\Vas the more consistent with the fundamental purposes of the act, and therefore rejected the conventional, common law definition.
71 Hand, "The Speech of Justice," 29 HAR.v. L. REv. 617 at 620 (1916).
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counsel may find it hard to persuade the judge to read the provisions of a labor contract "not as theorems of Euclid, but with
some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them." It may
sometimes be extraordinarily difficult to convey a sense of purpose
through testimony, briefs and oral argument; but these are all
familiar tasks of advocacy which hardly affect the nature of the
issues.
Unfortunately, many of the most important questions of interpretation are not soluble by reference to the fundamental
purposes of the collective agreement-at least not in the sense in
which that term is usually understood. The difficulty arises from
the fact that management and labor often have conflicting aims
and objectives, and the interpretation put upon the contract may
depend upon which objective is chosen as the major premise. The
point is illustrated by a dispute which I heard as arbitrator some
years ago over the meaning of a clause in the grievance procedure.
The clause stipulated that a grievance which could not be settled
with the foreman should be taken up in a second step-"Between
the Shop Committee (including the steward in the department
where the grievance originated) and the Division Superintendent."
The contract was executed after a long strike which almost
wiped out the local union. The International took the president
of the local out of the plant in an effort to rebuild and put her on
a full-time salary with the sole task of serving the employees in
the mill in question. As an employee she had been on the shop
committee. TWUA wished her to continue to be present at the
second step of the grievance procedure. The company objected on
the ground that one who was not an employee could not be a
member of the "shop committee." There is some force to the
verbal argument but it can be countered with the contention that
the clause should not be taken as an exclusive list of the persons
who might participate because this interpretation would exclude
everyone on the company's side except the division superintendent.
Verbally the case was a stand-off. The president of the local union
had some familiarity with the ways of collective bargaining; she
was self-possessed, quick and articulate. The employees on the
shop committee were unusually inexperienced and inarticulate.
If one started from the premise that the grievance procedure was
intended to be a forum in which both sides of a question should
be presented effectively in the hope of reaching a reasoned decision, the local president should be allowed to attend with, or as
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a member of, the shop committee. The third and fourth steps
would be handled by officials of the International Union. I assume
that this was roughly the purpose which the union attributed to
the grievance procedure. The employer's reputation was strongly
anti-union. At this particular mill, one of its few unionized plants,
the union had almost disintegrated because of the strike. It seems
realistic to suppose that the company hoped that the union's administration of the contract would be so inefficient and inept that
the employees would lose interest. From this premise one would
logically come to the view that Step 2 should be narrowly interpreted in order to keep the union ineffective. Thus the issue
really turned upon whether one took the union's purpose or the
company's purpose as the guiding premise. I ruled for the union72
and would do so again, but candor compels me to recognize that
this conception of the collective bargain as an instrument intended
to operate effectively was imposed upon the parties from outside
in defiance of the employer's intent, which must have been known
to the union, because the arbitrator chose to be guided by the
national labor policy or perhaps by a personal predilection for
effective union participation.
Although the preceding illustration may seem unimportant,
the type of conflict which it illustrates lies at the bottom of many
of the toughest problems of interpretation. Let me use two common examples, one involving discharge and the other subcontracting, in order to bring out the difficulty.
Suppose that an employee is discharged for what the union
thinks is insufficient cause during the term of a collective bargaining agreement which contains most of the customary provisions,
including recognition, seniority, grievance, and arbitration clauses
but which imposes no express limitation upon the management's
power to discharge. Of course the exact words of the contract make
a difference but one reading the opinions gets the feeling that it
is not the language which leads courts to deny relief while arbitrators examine the merits of the discharge. 73 In Coca-Cola Bottling
72 Textile Workers Union and Ludlow Mfg. Co., reprinted in Cox, CAsES ON LABOR
LAw, 4th ed., 650 (1958).
73 Compare United Furniture Workers of America v. Little Rock Furniture Mfg.
Co., (E.D. Ark. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 129; Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah (2d)
106, 307 P. (2d) 210 (1957), with Coca-Cola Bottling Co., reprinted in Cox, CASES ON
LABoR LAw, 4th ed., 583 (1958). Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. Rep. 747 (1949); Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. Rep. 761 (1954). But see Okenite Co., 22 Lab. Arb.
Rep. 756 (1954).
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Co. of Boston Saul Wallen reasoned that" ... the meaning of the
contract, when viewed as a whole, is that a limitation on the
employer's right to discharge was created with the birth of the
instrument. Both the necessity for maintaining the integrity of
the contract's component parts and the very nature of collective
bargaining agreements are the basis for this conclusion." 74
There is little force to the argument that the implication of
a clause limiting discharges to cases of just cause is necessary to
preserve the integrity of a seniority clause or grievance procedure.
The integrity of the seniority and grievance clauses would not be
affected by the arbitrary and capricious discharge of a junior employee who had no grievance.
Mr. Wallen's reliance upon "the very nature of collective
bargaining agreements" cuts much deeper. He thereby asserts
that a company which signs a collective bargaining agreement
automatically assumes some obligations and submits certain management actions to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator even though
the agreement says nothing about them. The dissenting member
of the arbitration board spoke the truth when he protested _that
the majority "have taken a contract which contained no language
which could possibly be construed as a limitation on the Company's right of discharge and have implied a very stringent limitation on that right," 75 but this assertion did not meet the basic contention that employees had rights cognizable by the arbitrator in
addition to those which the contract expressly gave them.
Some of the subcontracting cases which have been so much
debated in recent years raise the same kind of issues although
others may turn upon narrower reasoning. Suppose that a manufacturer of heavy steam valves is a party to a contract which makes
no mention of subcontracting but contains, in addition to the
arbitration clause, such customary provisions as a recognition
clause, a seniority clause, a discharge clause and a schedule of
wage rates. The manufacturer sublets the machining of certain
parts to an independent concern instead of following his previously
unbroken practice of doing all his own production. There are
layoffs and a reduction of overtime. The union protests that the
contract has been violated and takes the case to arbitration. There

74 Coca-Cola

Bottling Co., reprinted in Cox,
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is precedent for the view that subcontracting is a reserved right
of management.76 There are also decisions upholding the union's
.contention on grounds reminiscent of Mr. Wallen's reasoning in
· the Coca-Cola case:
" ... the Recognition clause, where considered together with
the Wage clause, the Seniority clauses, and other clauses
establishing standards for covered jobs and employees limits
the Company's right to subcontract during the term of the
Contract ... To allow the Company, ... to lay off the employees and transfer. the work to employees not covered by
the agreed standards would subvert the contract and destroy
the meaning of the collective bargaining relation." 77
I suggested earlier that the collective bargaining agreement,
unlike most other contracts, is an instrument of government because it regulates diverse affairs of many people with conflicting
interests over a substantial period of time. One can phrase the basic
problem of interpretation in the discharge and subcontracting cases
by saying that the parties differ with respect to the kind of government which they propose to establish. Is it a monarchy except
insofar as the employer has assumed the obligations explicitly
stated or fairly implied from the contract? Or has the whole realm
of matters of mutual concern to employer and employees been
brought within the joint authority of the company and union
,under a regime in which the legislative process is performed in
annual contract negotiations and the executive and judicial process
is carried out under a grievance procedure ending in arbitration?
Usually the realm of matters of mutual concern is divided, part
to be regulated by the employer and part to be governed by joint
authority under the regime established by the contract. The issue
·then becomes, which matters are regulated by one form of government and which by the other. Did the Coca-Cola contract move
discharges into the area of collective bargaining, i.e., of joint
responsibility, or were they left to the sole responsibility of man76 Amalgamated Assn. of Street Electric Railway Employees v. The Greyhound Corp.,
(5th Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 585; International Longshoremen's Union v. Inland Waterways
'Corp., 213 La. 670, 35 S. (2d) 425 (1948); Anno. 57 AL.R. (2d) 1399 (1958). Cf. Amalgamated Assn. of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees v. Eastern Mass.
Street Ry. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1958) 162 F. Supp. 942. For illustrative arbitration rulings,
see Hercules Powder Co., 21 Lab. Arb. Rep. 330 (1953); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp.,
23 Lab. Arb. Rep. 171 (1954).
77 A. D. Juilliard Co., 21 Lab. Arb. Rep. 713 at 724 (1953). See also Celanese Corp.,
14 Lab. Arb. Rep. 31 (1950); Stockholders Publ. Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. Rep. 644 (1951).
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agement? What about subcontracting? It is to the basic conflict over
the size of the area subject to joint responsibility that I refer when
I speak of the lack of a common purpose on the part of both management and labor to which questions of interpretation can be
referred. Going a step further, I suggest that this is the very essence
of large parts of a collective bargaining agreement-it has the
nature of an armed truce in a continuing struggle, yet the armistice
line has not been put on a map.
Before discussing the significance of this highly tentative conclusion I should like to insist upon two distinctions. First, I submit that problems of the kind illustrated by the discharge and
subcontracting cases will sometimes yield to analysis in terms of
familiar contract principles. The notion that ordinary commercial
contracts spell out all their obligations is a silly canard. Every
contract, whether a typical commercial contract or a labor agreement contains "an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."78 One who sells a retail milk business impliedly promises
that he will not solicit former customers. 79 A lease of coal lands in
exchange for a schedule of royalties implies an obligation to mine
the coal diligently. 80 Under the Coca-Cola-type contract there
should be no hesitation in setting aside a discharge aimed at circumventing seniority or defeating a grievance even though the
contract says nothing about discharges because such a discharge
destroys the right of the employees to have the fruits of their
bargain. Upon this familiar principle of contracts one might
fairly conclude in the absence of other evidence that the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement establishing wages and labor
standards imply an obligation not to seek a substitute labor supply at lower wages or inferior standards. The implied promise
would prohibit subcontracting for this purpose. But there are
limitations to the covenant of honesty and fair dealing. A manufacturer who sells goods when the price is high is not precluded
from doubling his output because this would impair the value of
the buyer's purchase. A collective bargaining agreement does not
imply a promise that the employer will not deprive the union and
the employees of its benefits by closing an obsolete plant or dropping an unprofitable line of business. Similarly, the implied

78 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §670 (1936).
79 Cf. Colton v. Duval, 254 Mich. 346, 237 N.W. 48

(1931).
so Mendota Coal & Coke Co. v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., (9th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 77.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing can hardly be supposed
to reach subcontracting which is based upon business considerations other than the cost of acquiring labor under the collective
agreement. In such a case either management is free to act or some
limitation must be found in the very nature of a collective bargaining agreement.
·
The second distinction which I wish to press is a differentiation
between (I) implying obligations within the general area of terms
and conditions of employment brought under the regime of the
collective bargaining agreement and (2) implying restrictions
upon management by drawing the boundary line more favorably
to the union. One could put the discharge and subcontracting
cases in more familiar terms than I have used by saying that the
critical issue is whether a collective bargaining agreement is simply
a document by which the union and the employees have imposed
upon management limited restrictions of its otherwise absolute
right to manage the enterprise, so that an employee's claim must
always fail unless he can point to a specific contract provision on
which the claim is founded. But this reserved-rights phraseology
obscures the very distinction which I wish to press. Management
and labor are certainly free to bring some areas of mutual concern
under the regime of collective bargaining and to assign others
exclusively to management. This is true as a matter of legal theory,
and the freedom is exercised as a matter of practical living. Within
the area put under the regime of collective bargaining, however,
it is hardly practicable to make the contract the exclusive source
of rights, remedies and duties. There are too many people, too
many problems, too many unforeseeable contingencies, too many
variations-one cannot reduce all the· rules governing the community of an industrial plant to fifteen or even fifty pages. The
logic of the governmental nature of the process of collective bargaining therefore creates a strong presumption that within the
sphere of collective bargaining the parties, if they had thought
about it, would have acknowledged the need and therefore the
existence of a common law of the shop which furnishes the context of, and also implements, the agreement. Interpretation should
give effect to this presumption arising from the very nature of
a collective agreement unless the agreement states a contrary rule
in pretty plain language.
A good. many people experienced in management may spontaneously challenge the statement that the contract cannot be the
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exclusive guide to all questions arising thereunder but I suspect
that when pressed, most of them will concede the accuracy of my
presumption in the only sense in which I intend it. Many ~ontracts
limit the employer's right to discharge employees to cases w~ere
there is "just cause" but say nothing about the power to impose
lesser discipline. Does anyone deny an arbitrator appointed under
such a contract the power to decide whether there was just cause for
a disciplinary layoff even though his jurisdiction is limited to the
"interpretation and application of any provision of this agreement"? Again, suppose that a contract fixes a seven-day time limit
upon the appeal of grievances from the foreman's ruling and that
the employee and shop steward wait ten days to appeal upon the
strength of the personnel director's specific assurance that the company will not enforce the time limit. Surely there are only a few
stern literalists who would deny the grievance without examining
the merits if the company invoked the time limit as a bar to arbitration. The customary disposition would be to ignore the time
limit upon grounds of waiver or estoppel. These doctrines obviously grant remedies, if not rights, based upon motions of justice
which are not spelled out in the agreement. And does not an
arbitrator resort to such a body of law when he grants reinstatement with back pay as a remedy for an unjustified discharge?81
Occasionally arbitrators and courts have come into conflict
because of the court's failure to perceive this need for an industrial
jurisprudence within the area of labor-management relations
brought under the joint authority of management and labor. A
Remington Rand contract provided: "Seniority ... is defined to
mean length of service with the Company ~ince the last date of
hire at whatever location and in whatever capacity employed."
An employee who had resigned was rehired on September 25,
1950. As a result of a mistake, however, the company record gave
him the seniority date of May 21, 1945, which was the date of his
original employment prior to the resignation. The erroneous date
was carried fonvard for five years in published seniority listings.
It was the basis upon which two prior grievances had been adjusted
at the local level. Thereafter the company attempted to correct

Bl Compare Refinery Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., (W.D. La. 1958) 160
F. Supp. 723, with such arbitration decisions as International Harvester Co., 9 Lab. Arb.
Rep. 894 (1947); Phillips Chemical Co., 17 Lab. Arb. Rep. 721 (1951); and Mississippi
Aluminum Co., 27 Lab. Arb. Rep. 625 (1956).
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the seniority date in offering an opportunity for promotion. The
arbitrator held that the seniority list had become frozen despite
the mistake. "[T]here must come a time when past errors which
have not been challenged or corrected by either party, or by individual employees, must be accepted as the agreed understanding
and no longer subject to change." 82
The Supreme Court of New York vacated the award upon the
employer's motion. The judge declared that the ruling "flies in
the face of the words of the contract" and expressed wonderment
that "highly qualified and sincere arbitrators" could have reached
such a result. 83 The explanation is both simple and revealing. The
arbitrator recognized that every contract must be interpreted and
applied through an industrial jurisprudence. The judge felt bound
to the written word, although courts have exercised greater liberality for centuries in applying the Statute of Frauds. In my opinion
the judge made a serious error.
The imperative which requires a body of "common law" in the
area marked off by the contract for government under the regime
established by the contract has no place in deciding what area has
been marked off. There is nothing in the function of a collective
bargaining agreement which makes the reserved management
rights view, when confined to this issue, either more or less serviceable than the opposing view sometimes espoused by labor
unions. Nor can guidance be found in an underlying purpose or
intent unless those words include a purpose to strike a compromise,
for on this issue management and union usually stand in opposition. Where then is the judge or arbitrator to turn in deciding the
discharge or subcontracting question, or any other issue concerning the scope of area marked off for government under the contract
but on which the contract is silent?
I have no answer to these questions-only a conviction that the
search is one which ought to be pursued more consciously in general terms, even though the answer is the pot of gold at the end
of the rainbow. Ideally the parties should write the answer into
the contract, for the choice is theirs, but often the difference of
opinion is too deep and too enduring for either party to express
in writing even its temporary acceptance of the position of the
other. While arbitrators can get along by saying that each case

82 Remington
83 In re IUE,

Rand Co., 27 Lab. Arb. Rep. 880 at 887-889 (1956).
27 Lab. Arb. Rep. 779 at 780 (1957).
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must be decid~d on its merits, the courts can hardly be expected
to accept this view unless it is made part of a coherent philosophy.
And as I suggested in the beginning, LMRA section 30 I and the
Lincoln Mills decision make it impossible for arbitrators to go
their separate way much longer brushing off judicial attitudes
as the result of immersion in ordinary contracts and ignorance of
the peculiarities of collective bargaining agreements.
One possible course is to accept the "reserved rights" view
subject to the two qualifications already suggested. Most judges
appear to adopt this position without the qualifications, although
few of them have felt impelled to state the doctrine squarely.
Professor Gregory may overstate the case when he says that apart
from its unpopularity with unions the doctrine is generally accepted, but I suspect that a poll of arbitrators would give the
doctrine a majority, provided that the ballot was secret. Furthermore, it is at least historically accurate to describe collective agreements as instruments by which the unions have gradually taken
away the erstwhile prerogatives of management.84
The alternative may be stated as follows. Every collective
bargaining agreement is by its very nature the product of conflicting desires concerning the sphere of joint government established
by the collective agreement. Sometimes the sphere is expressly
delineated with all the rest reserved as management prerogatives
but as often as not the impossibility of making an explicit compromise, coupled ·with the impossibility of not reaching an agreement, results in a more or less ambiguous silence. The task of
finding where the boundaries would have been drawn if the parties
who signed the contract had drawn them explicitly is then a problem of interpretation within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator who
is given power to decide questions concerning the interpretation
and application of the agreement. For it is the agreement that
draws the boundary line even though it does not draw it expressly.
The interpreter must remember that the contract goes a distance
but also that it stops, because it is a product of competing wills and
its policy inheres as much in its limitations as in its affirmations.
Nor is the interpreter left wholly without guidance. Even a vague
84 The reserved rights theory may have to be modified in order to accommodate it
to the theory of collective bargaining developed under the National Labor Relations Act.
See Cox and Dunlop, "The Duty To Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing
Agreement," 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097 (1950). At the moment I am concerned only with
what is brought under the rule of the contract.
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management-functions clause suggests that the boundaries may be
narrower than under a contract without it. An integrated writing
clause bespeaks narrow interpretation. Surely an open-ended arbitration clause indicates a wider area of joint sovereignty than a
clause limiting the arbitrator to the interpretation and application
of the contract. In the discharge case it would not be implausible
to conclude, if the words of the contract are otherwise blind, that
review of discharges to determine whether there is just cause is
more consistent with a contract granting other forms of job security and industrial justice than is the reservation of untrammelled power to discharge for any reason which the employer
deems sufficient. The plausibility is less, if indeed there is any, in
the case of subcontracting or shift schedules.
These last suggestions are the common stuff of arbitration
decisions, but there is need for a coherent rationalization if this
conception of the arbitrator's task is to find its way into the law
of collective bargaining agreements. The suggestions made here
are hardly a beginning. A single word may be added in conclusion.
In the final analysis the arbitrator or the judge must make a choice.
He may be an activist and impose his view upon the agreement
when its words leave scope, bringing doubtful territory into the
joint realm because he thinks that he knows that this is fair and
good industrial relations. A wise and respected man may do much
good through this conception of the arbitrator's function. It may
also be right to follow the quieter role which Learned Hand
assigns a judge in interpreting a statute the reach of which was
sharply disputed.
" ... But the judge must always remember that he should go
no further than the government would have gone, had it been
faced with the case before him. If he is in doubt, he must stop,
for he cannot tell that the conflicting interests in the society
for which he speaks would have come to a just result, even
though he is sure that he knows what the just result should be.
He is not to substitute even his juster will for theirs; otherwise
it would not be the common-will which prevails, and to that
extent the people would not govern." 85
The parties can make the choice when they select their
arbitrator.
85 Hand, "How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?" in Law Series I,
Lecture 14 at 5 (National Advisory Council on Radio in Education, 1933).

